Reflections on Radical Traditionalism: Why it is a Danger

“Woe to you, scribes and Pharisees, you hypocrites. You traverse sea and land to make one convert, and when that happens you make him a child of Gehenna twice as much as yourselves.” (Matt 23:15)

Preliminary Disclaimer

As always, one needs to recognize there is a difference between the person who prefers the liturgy and the discipline of the time before Vatican II but respects the authority of the Pope to make changes for the good of the Church and the radical who claims that the Pope who makes such changes is in error. This article deals with the second group, not the first group.

Introduction

I’ve seen the comments on blogs, heard it from friends. The claim that the Vatican, in “going after” radical Traditionalists and disciplining them are wasting time on groups “too small to matter” and should be going after Modernists instead.

I have two quarrels with this claim. The first is a logical objection. The second is an objection to the claim that the Radical Traditionalists are harmless or less harmful.

PART I

The Logical Problem of the Claim: Affirming the Disjunct

Ironically, the claim that the Vatican should be going after Liberals or Modernists is essentially the same fallacy used by Doug Kmiec to propose Obama as a “pro-life” candidate.

1. We can either do [A] or [B]
2. People are doing [B]
3. Therefore they are not doing [A]

The problem is, of course, “Either [A] or [B]” are not the only options, and the fact that the Church does [B] is no proof they are neglecting [A]. This is the fallacy of Affirming the Disjunct. The problem is just because condition [B] exists, does not mean that condition [A] cannot exist as well. Kmiec made this error in arguing we can either seek to end Roe v. Wade or we can help women seeking abortions, and arguing those opposing Obama sought to end abortions therefore those opposing abortion are not in favor of helping women.

This is of course nonsense.

However the defenders of the radical traditionalists make the same error. They assume the sanctions invoked against the radical traditionalists means nothing is being done against the modernists. The enthymeme of this argument is that “it can’t be both [A] and [B]” which needs to be proven, but is usually bypassed by the argument from silence (“I never hear of the Church disciplining liberals, therefore they don’t.”) and when evidence is provided, the fallacy of “moving the goalposts” is used (“The Church never disciplines liberals!” “What about Milingo or others?” “That’s not enough!”)

The only way to avoid the fallacy is by first providing proof that the condition is exclusively [A] or [B]. However, this is never done. Rather it is merely assumed. Examples in favor of the argument are promoted. Examples which show the condition is not exclusively [A] or [B] are ignored.

PART II

Are Radical Traditionalists In Fact Harmless?

Let’s make no mistake here. The Liberal dissenters are indeed doing wrong and need to be opposed. However, the liberal dissenters are not a group who are likely to deceive the Catholic who is seeking to do what is right and to follow the Church teaching. The teachings of Hans Küng, Charles Curran, Joan Chittister do not appeal to the person seeking what they must do to be faithful. They appeal to the person who is seeking an excuse to disobey.

However, the Radical Traditionalists are also dangerous because they can mislead the person who is looking for the way to follow the true Church. Consider, for example, the case of Gerry Matatics, who entered the Church in 1986, became a Radical Traditionalist in 1992 and is now proclaiming the Post Vatican II Church is heretical and that Pope Benedict XVI is most likely not the true Pope (the logic of his syllogisms are terrible by the way, assuming what needs to be proven). Matatics is an extreme example of what one seeking to be faithful can become. However, less extreme cases are common indeed.

Becoming what one condemns

The problem I see with the Radical Traditionalist is that while the subject matter of their dissent is different from those of the Liberal Modernist dissenter, the form of their nature is chillingly similar.

• A position is staked out in opposition to what the Magisterium holds
• Documents are selectively cited seeking to show a contradiction of the present Magisterium with past popes or councils
• The conclusion is made that the present Magisterium is in error.

There is a serious problem with this view however, whether the one who makes use of it is modernist or radical traditionalist, and that is the fact that it all centers on the personal interpretation of the selected documents. Whether it is the so-called “Spirit of Vatican II” or whether it is a radical traditionalist focusing on a 19^th century condemnation of religious indifferentism to claim that the relations between Catholics and others must be eternally acrimonious, both refuse to recognize the authority of the Magisterium when it comes down on a side contrary to what one holds.

Thus, instead of recognizing the possibility of erring personally, the error is thus automatically assumed to be on the part of the Church. Ironically, both sides will recognize the disobedience of the other side, but not their own disobedience. It’s as if Christ never said in Matthew 7:

^1 “Stop judging, that you may not be judged.

^2 For as you judge, so will you be judged, and the measure with which you measure will be measured out to you.

^3 Why do you notice the splinter in your brother’s eye, but do not perceive the wooden beam in your own eye?

^4 How can you say to your brother, ‘Let me remove that splinter from your eye,’ while the wooden beam is in your eye?

^5 You hypocrite, remove the wooden beam from your eye first; then you will see clearly to remove the splinter from your brother’s eye.

Quite frankly, when both sides make use of judging the other of refusing to obey the magisterium on a specific topic, but refuse to obey on their own areas of contention, they do behave hypocritically.

Appeal to an Ideal(ism)

Fundamentalism is often used as a slur, and is used so broadly that it is almost worthless as a descriptor. Generally speaking it associates “fundamentalist” with “right wing politics.” However, in the most general sense, Fundamentalism can be understood as holding there was once a time when religion was practiced perfectly (or at least better), and to be perfect, one must go back to the practices of this time. Now of course the appeal to the practices to be followed can be real (such as the traditionalistic “Pre-conciliar” view) or to a fictional (such as the claims of some liberals that the early Church was “pre-hierarchical”).

The Problem is the issue of conditions which were different. If the Church in the 13^th century was the pinnacle of Christendom, we certainly need to recognize that the circumstances at this time were certainly different than they are in the 21^st century and practices of the Church in the sense of discipline could not even remotely be handled the same way. Similarly, the appeal of some radical traditionalists who misuse the axiom lex orendi lex credenda (The Law of prayer is the law of belief) of St. Prosper of Aquitane to say that the changing of the liturgy led to a collapse of beliefs and heretical priests. This can be demonstrated as a post hoc fallacy by pointing out a few facts. Dissenting priests were present before Vatican II and the 1970 missal. Humanae Vitae which was widely dissented from was written before the 1970 missal (in 1968 to be precise).

If the change of the liturgy caused the change of belief, then it is not demonstrated by the evidence. Indeed, the appeal to “go back” to before Vatican II or before the current form of the Mass is based on an idealism which forgets the growing disillusionment with authority in the 1950s. It overlooks the assimilation of Catholics into mainstream society in the 1950s and 1960s, and it overlooks the general rejection of authority in Catholic, Protestant and entirely non-Christian nations in the mid to late 1960s. Instead they submit an idealistic sequence:

1. Before Vatican II, the Church was strong
2. After Vatican II, the Church was weak
3. Therefore Vatican II caused the Church to weaken

Of course if there is any other reason besides Vatican II which caused this, the alleged cause-effect is wrong.

The Authority to Bind and Loose

It has been a doctrine of the Catholic Church that the authority to bind and to loose. It is de fide (a matter of faith which is not to be contradicted by one who claims to be a faithful Catholic) that Peter had primacy of jurisdiction over the entire Church and that this primacy extends to his successors. This primacy is not just over matters of faith and morals but also over the matters of discipline and government of the Church (See Ott, Fundamentals of Catholic Dogma pages 279, 282, 285). Pope Pius XII made clear in the encyclical Humani Generis that the idea that the Pope must only be obeyed on matters of ex cathedra is an error. He says:

20. Nor must it be thought that what is expounded in Encyclical Letters does not of itself demand consent, since in writing such Letters the Popes do not exercise the supreme power of their Teaching Authority. For these matters are taught with the ordinary teaching authority, of which it is true to say: "He who heareth you, heareth me"; and generally what is expounded and inculcated in Encyclical Letters already for other reasons appertains to Catholic doctrine. But if the Supreme Pontiffs in their official documents purposely pass judgment on a matter up to that time under dispute, it is obvious that that matter, according to the mind and will of the Pontiffs, cannot be any longer considered a question open to discussion among theologians.

In other words, when the Pope teaches in a binding manner using the ordinary magisterium, he must be heeded.

The Pope has authority to interpret Scripture and Tradition, and we do believe that when he teaches authoritatively as Pope and not as a private theologian, we are to obey.

Here then is the irony of the Radical Traditionalist who claims to be the followers of true Catholic teaching. To defend their rebellion against Vatican II, they must violate the de fide teaching of the Catholic Church on exactly who has the final right of interpretation. The radical traditionalist who accuses the Church of today of being riddled with “the errors of Protestantism” is actually performing the same act they find so offensive when done by Luther and others in rejecting the Catholic teaching due to their own interpretation and their own decision of what is to be given credibility.

Thus the dissenter (Traditionalist or Modernist) does not evaluate his or her belief based on the Magisterium teaching, but evaluates the Magisterium teaching based on his or her belief. This makes the Teaching authority of the Church superfluous. When it agrees with the dissenter it is unnecessary. When it disagrees with the dissenter, the teaching authority is wrong.

Why the Radical Traditionalist IS a Danger to the Church

The Catholic who is seeking to follow the Catholic faith and knows the authority of the Popes and the long line of consistent teaching is rather unlikely to consider a dissenter like Küng to be a voice of authority. One looking for an excuse to dissent might use his sophistry to justify disobedience, but one seeking to obey the Church would not.

What makes the radical traditionalist dangerous is the fact that he claims to be following the true teaching of the Church. Like an anti-Catholic seeking to “rescue” a person from the Catholic Church and takes Scripture out of context to do so, the radical traditionalist has often cited old Church documents and compared them with new Church documents. He plays upon the faithful individual’s recognizing that there is indeed rebellion and disobedience in the Church, and leads them to think that it is the fault of “modernists” and “freemasons” within the Church [Prior to the end of the Cold War, Communism was also invoked] who have infiltrated the Church to teach error. Much literature of slanderous character has been published accusing Blessed John XXIII and Paul VI of being freemasons. Such literature is seldom repudiated by the officials of the SSPX.

When you consider that the SSPX has seminaries which teaches formally that one can disobey the Magisterium when it goes against their judgment on the grounds that if they disagree they are tainted with heresy, you can see the danger of such a system for the would-be faithful Catholic and see why the Magisterium must oppose them and not leave them be.

Radical Traditionalists are Not Misunderstood when they are Opposed

I have no doubt that a good percentage of the Catholics who prefer the Mass of the 1962 missal (See The Reform of the Reform? for a balanced view of the issue) are indeed faithful Catholics. They may not like the current form of the Mass and attend the legitimate Extraordinary Form when they can, but they accept the authority of the Magisterium and oppose rebellion.

Radical Traditionalists on the other hand are in disobedience to the Magisterium. There obedience only follows as long as the Magisterium does as they think right. When they say “Do not listen to Rome, listen to me” they are indeed a danger to the Church. It is wrong to think of the issue as “All they want is the Latin Mass. Why not go after the Liberals who support abortion?” As I pointed out in the beginning of this article, this is the fallacy of Affirming the Disjunct. The Church is indeed going after them with some strong actions indeed even if it is not always handled as we would personally like. However, the existence of the liberal dissent does not justify traditionalist dissent.

Conclusion

The dissenter, whether modernist or traditionalist, might be quite sincere in their disobedience. They might actually believe the Church is wrong. So here is the rub: If the Catholic Church believes it must teach as it does, and the dissenter disagrees with the Church then there are two options:

1. They are wrong and the Church is right. In this case, they must reevaluate their position and cease to be in error.
2. They are right and the Church is wrong. In this case, the dissenter must reevaluate their relationship with the Church they believe to be teaching error

If the obedience to the Pope as the successor of Peter is a de fide position and the Church teaches something the dissenter believes is wrong, then either the dissenter is in error or the Church is not protected from error… which would mean the Catholic Church is not the Church Christ promised to protect.

If the Radical Traditionalist decides to remain within the Church while refusing to accept the authoritative teaching of the Magisterium, it is really a case of Cafeteria Catholicism.

Reflections on Radical Traditionalism: Why it is a Danger

“Woe to you, scribes and Pharisees, you hypocrites. You traverse sea and land to make one convert, and when that happens you make him a child of Gehenna twice as much as yourselves.” (Matt 23:15)

Preliminary Disclaimer

As always, one needs to recognize there is a difference between the person who prefers the liturgy and the discipline of the time before Vatican II but respects the authority of the Pope to make changes for the good of the Church and the radical who claims that the Pope who makes such changes is in error. This article deals with the second group, not the first group.

Introduction

I’ve seen the comments on blogs, heard it from friends. The claim that the Vatican, in “going after” radical Traditionalists and disciplining them are wasting time on groups “too small to matter” and should be going after Modernists instead.

I have two quarrels with this claim. The first is a logical objection. The second is an objection to the claim that the Radical Traditionalists are harmless or less harmful.

PART I

The Logical Problem of the Claim: Affirming the Disjunct

Ironically, the claim that the Vatican should be going after Liberals or Modernists is essentially the same fallacy used by Doug Kmiec to propose Obama as a “pro-life” candidate.

1. We can either do [A] or [B]
2. People are doing [B]
3. Therefore they are not doing [A]

The problem is, of course, “Either [A] or [B]” are not the only options, and the fact that the Church does [B] is no proof they are neglecting [A]. This is the fallacy of Affirming the Disjunct. The problem is just because condition [B] exists, does not mean that condition [A] cannot exist as well. Kmiec made this error in arguing we can either seek to end Roe v. Wade or we can help women seeking abortions, and arguing those opposing Obama sought to end abortions therefore those opposing abortion are not in favor of helping women.

This is of course nonsense.

However the defenders of the radical traditionalists make the same error. They assume the sanctions invoked against the radical traditionalists means nothing is being done against the modernists. The enthymeme of this argument is that “it can’t be both [A] and [B]” which needs to be proven, but is usually bypassed by the argument from silence (“I never hear of the Church disciplining liberals, therefore they don’t.”) and when evidence is provided, the fallacy of “moving the goalposts” is used (“The Church never disciplines liberals!” “What about Milingo or others?” “That’s not enough!”)

The only way to avoid the fallacy is by first providing proof that the condition is exclusively [A] or [B]. However, this is never done. Rather it is merely assumed. Examples in favor of the argument are promoted. Examples which show the condition is not exclusively [A] or [B] are ignored.

PART II

Are Radical Traditionalists In Fact Harmless?

Let’s make no mistake here. The Liberal dissenters are indeed doing wrong and need to be opposed. However, the liberal dissenters are not a group who are likely to deceive the Catholic who is seeking to do what is right and to follow the Church teaching. The teachings of Hans Küng, Charles Curran, Joan Chittister do not appeal to the person seeking what they must do to be faithful. They appeal to the person who is seeking an excuse to disobey.

However, the Radical Traditionalists are also dangerous because they can mislead the person who is looking for the way to follow the true Church. Consider, for example, the case of Gerry Matatics, who entered the Church in 1986, became a Radical Traditionalist in 1992 and is now proclaiming the Post Vatican II Church is heretical and that Pope Benedict XVI is most likely not the true Pope (the logic of his syllogisms are terrible by the way, assuming what needs to be proven). Matatics is an extreme example of what one seeking to be faithful can become. However, less extreme cases are common indeed.

Becoming what one condemns

The problem I see with the Radical Traditionalist is that while the subject matter of their dissent is different from those of the Liberal Modernist dissenter, the form of their nature is chillingly similar.

• A position is staked out in opposition to what the Magisterium holds
• Documents are selectively cited seeking to show a contradiction of the present Magisterium with past popes or councils
• The conclusion is made that the present Magisterium is in error.

There is a serious problem with this view however, whether the one who makes use of it is modernist or radical traditionalist, and that is the fact that it all centers on the personal interpretation of the selected documents. Whether it is the so-called “Spirit of Vatican II” or whether it is a radical traditionalist focusing on a 19^th century condemnation of religious indifferentism to claim that the relations between Catholics and others must be eternally acrimonious, both refuse to recognize the authority of the Magisterium when it comes down on a side contrary to what one holds.

Thus, instead of recognizing the possibility of erring personally, the error is thus automatically assumed to be on the part of the Church. Ironically, both sides will recognize the disobedience of the other side, but not their own disobedience. It’s as if Christ never said in Matthew 7:

^1 “Stop judging, that you may not be judged.

^2 For as you judge, so will you be judged, and the measure with which you measure will be measured out to you.

^3 Why do you notice the splinter in your brother’s eye, but do not perceive the wooden beam in your own eye?

^4 How can you say to your brother, ‘Let me remove that splinter from your eye,’ while the wooden beam is in your eye?

^5 You hypocrite, remove the wooden beam from your eye first; then you will see clearly to remove the splinter from your brother’s eye.

Quite frankly, when both sides make use of judging the other of refusing to obey the magisterium on a specific topic, but refuse to obey on their own areas of contention, they do behave hypocritically.

Appeal to an Ideal(ism)

Fundamentalism is often used as a slur, and is used so broadly that it is almost worthless as a descriptor. Generally speaking it associates “fundamentalist” with “right wing politics.” However, in the most general sense, Fundamentalism can be understood as holding there was once a time when religion was practiced perfectly (or at least better), and to be perfect, one must go back to the practices of this time. Now of course the appeal to the practices to be followed can be real (such as the traditionalistic “Pre-conciliar” view) or to a fictional (such as the claims of some liberals that the early Church was “pre-hierarchical”).

The Problem is the issue of conditions which were different. If the Church in the 13^th century was the pinnacle of Christendom, we certainly need to recognize that the circumstances at this time were certainly different than they are in the 21^st century and practices of the Church in the sense of discipline could not even remotely be handled the same way. Similarly, the appeal of some radical traditionalists who misuse the axiom lex orendi lex credenda (The Law of prayer is the law of belief) of St. Prosper of Aquitane to say that the changing of the liturgy led to a collapse of beliefs and heretical priests. This can be demonstrated as a post hoc fallacy by pointing out a few facts. Dissenting priests were present before Vatican II and the 1970 missal. Humanae Vitae which was widely dissented from was written before the 1970 missal (in 1968 to be precise).

If the change of the liturgy caused the change of belief, then it is not demonstrated by the evidence. Indeed, the appeal to “go back” to before Vatican II or before the current form of the Mass is based on an idealism which forgets the growing disillusionment with authority in the 1950s. It overlooks the assimilation of Catholics into mainstream society in the 1950s and 1960s, and it overlooks the general rejection of authority in Catholic, Protestant and entirely non-Christian nations in the mid to late 1960s. Instead they submit an idealistic sequence:

1. Before Vatican II, the Church was strong
2. After Vatican II, the Church was weak
3. Therefore Vatican II caused the Church to weaken

Of course if there is any other reason besides Vatican II which caused this, the alleged cause-effect is wrong.

The Authority to Bind and Loose

It has been a doctrine of the Catholic Church that the authority to bind and to loose. It is de fide (a matter of faith which is not to be contradicted by one who claims to be a faithful Catholic) that Peter had primacy of jurisdiction over the entire Church and that this primacy extends to his successors. This primacy is not just over matters of faith and morals but also over the matters of discipline and government of the Church (See Ott, Fundamentals of Catholic Dogma pages 279, 282, 285). Pope Pius XII made clear in the encyclical Humani Generis that the idea that the Pope must only be obeyed on matters of ex cathedra is an error. He says:

20. Nor must it be thought that what is expounded in Encyclical Letters does not of itself demand consent, since in writing such Letters the Popes do not exercise the supreme power of their Teaching Authority. For these matters are taught with the ordinary teaching authority, of which it is true to say: "He who heareth you, heareth me"; and generally what is expounded and inculcated in Encyclical Letters already for other reasons appertains to Catholic doctrine. But if the Supreme Pontiffs in their official documents purposely pass judgment on a matter up to that time under dispute, it is obvious that that matter, according to the mind and will of the Pontiffs, cannot be any longer considered a question open to discussion among theologians.

In other words, when the Pope teaches in a binding manner using the ordinary magisterium, he must be heeded.

The Pope has authority to interpret Scripture and Tradition, and we do believe that when he teaches authoritatively as Pope and not as a private theologian, we are to obey.

Here then is the irony of the Radical Traditionalist who claims to be the followers of true Catholic teaching. To defend their rebellion against Vatican II, they must violate the de fide teaching of the Catholic Church on exactly who has the final right of interpretation. The radical traditionalist who accuses the Church of today of being riddled with “the errors of Protestantism” is actually performing the same act they find so offensive when done by Luther and others in rejecting the Catholic teaching due to their own interpretation and their own decision of what is to be given credibility.

Thus the dissenter (Traditionalist or Modernist) does not evaluate his or her belief based on the Magisterium teaching, but evaluates the Magisterium teaching based on his or her belief. This makes the Teaching authority of the Church superfluous. When it agrees with the dissenter it is unnecessary. When it disagrees with the dissenter, the teaching authority is wrong.

Why the Radical Traditionalist IS a Danger to the Church

The Catholic who is seeking to follow the Catholic faith and knows the authority of the Popes and the long line of consistent teaching is rather unlikely to consider a dissenter like Küng to be a voice of authority. One looking for an excuse to dissent might use his sophistry to justify disobedience, but one seeking to obey the Church would not.

What makes the radical traditionalist dangerous is the fact that he claims to be following the true teaching of the Church. Like an anti-Catholic seeking to “rescue” a person from the Catholic Church and takes Scripture out of context to do so, the radical traditionalist has often cited old Church documents and compared them with new Church documents. He plays upon the faithful individual’s recognizing that there is indeed rebellion and disobedience in the Church, and leads them to think that it is the fault of “modernists” and “freemasons” within the Church [Prior to the end of the Cold War, Communism was also invoked] who have infiltrated the Church to teach error. Much literature of slanderous character has been published accusing Blessed John XXIII and Paul VI of being freemasons. Such literature is seldom repudiated by the officials of the SSPX.

When you consider that the SSPX has seminaries which teaches formally that one can disobey the Magisterium when it goes against their judgment on the grounds that if they disagree they are tainted with heresy, you can see the danger of such a system for the would-be faithful Catholic and see why the Magisterium must oppose them and not leave them be.

Radical Traditionalists are Not Misunderstood when they are Opposed

I have no doubt that a good percentage of the Catholics who prefer the Mass of the 1962 missal (See The Reform of the Reform? for a balanced view of the issue) are indeed faithful Catholics. They may not like the current form of the Mass and attend the legitimate Extraordinary Form when they can, but they accept the authority of the Magisterium and oppose rebellion.

Radical Traditionalists on the other hand are in disobedience to the Magisterium. There obedience only follows as long as the Magisterium does as they think right. When they say “Do not listen to Rome, listen to me” they are indeed a danger to the Church. It is wrong to think of the issue as “All they want is the Latin Mass. Why not go after the Liberals who support abortion?” As I pointed out in the beginning of this article, this is the fallacy of Affirming the Disjunct. The Church is indeed going after them with some strong actions indeed even if it is not always handled as we would personally like. However, the existence of the liberal dissent does not justify traditionalist dissent.

Conclusion

The dissenter, whether modernist or traditionalist, might be quite sincere in their disobedience. They might actually believe the Church is wrong. So here is the rub: If the Catholic Church believes it must teach as it does, and the dissenter disagrees with the Church then there are two options:

1. They are wrong and the Church is right. In this case, they must reevaluate their position and cease to be in error.
2. They are right and the Church is wrong. In this case, the dissenter must reevaluate their relationship with the Church they believe to be teaching error

If the obedience to the Pope as the successor of Peter is a de fide position and the Church teaches something the dissenter believes is wrong, then either the dissenter is in error or the Church is not protected from error… which would mean the Catholic Church is not the Church Christ promised to protect.

If the Radical Traditionalist decides to remain within the Church while refusing to accept the authoritative teaching of the Magisterium, it is really a case of Cafeteria Catholicism.

Reflections on Divorce, Remarriage and the Church (Part I): Did Matthew Make an Exception?

Preliminary Disclaimer

This article is on the subject of seeking to end a valid marriage on the grounds of adultery by way of rejecting the authority of the Church.  It is not a commentary on annulments.  Nor is it a judgment on those who seek them. 

I do not claim the authority to make judgments on whether the Church should or should not grant  an annulment in any individual case.  A person wondering if they have grounds for annulment should contact their parish or diocese for information.

My only intent for this article is to explain why certain attacks against the Church on this subject are in error.

Introduction: Appeal to Emotion to challenge the Church

While the recent abuse stories are the most headline grabbing attacks on the Church, there are always the tried-and-true attacks on the Church from within and without, which essentially seeks to portray the Church as “heartless” because she believes she cannot compromise on certain issues. Whether it is an issue like contraception, or divorce, or abortion or so-called “gay marriage” (it is interesting to note that all these objections tend to focus on the area of sexual ethics) the position is presented that the Church is a heartless bureaucratic institution which clings to “rules” which Christ would not approve of.

Usually such a position is demonstrated with either the appeal to fear fallacy or the appeal to pity fallacy. An example is given (such as a family with “too many children” or the “abandoned spouse” or the woman with a “health condition” or two people “who truly love each other”) to whom we are supposed to have sympathy for. Because they are in a situation where the Church must say “No,” the argument is the Church is “cruel” in doing so.

Fallacies don’t prove anything

The problem is, this doesn’t prove the Church is wrong. Indeed, the attack against the Church is based on the unwarranted assumption that God is primarily interested in our material well-being, and that the concern for our spiritual well-being is unimportant.

The objection tends to run along the lines of:

1. The situation I am in is harmful because it makes me unhappy

2. God does not want to harm us

3. Therefore this situation which makes me unhappy is against God's will.

In certain areas of Church moral teaching, we see this sort of appeal.  "God knows we can't afford to have more children right now.  The Church condemns contraception.  Therefore the Church teaching is against God's will."  Or "God doesn't want me to be alone and my spouse abandoned me.  The Church forbids remarriage after divorce.  Therefore the Church is wrong."

Denying Happiness? Why this argument is missing the point

The problem with these arguments is that it frames the issue in the wrong way.

Because the dissent against the Church on the issue of Remarriage is so common, one needs to look at the issues and why the attacks against the Church fundamentally miss the point and negate that which is binding about marriage.

The problem of the objection against Church teaching is that it confuses the cause of the situation with the Church teaching on the situation.  For example, if a person in a valid marriage is divorced, the Church teaching is that so long as both partners live, they must reconcile or remain single.

Now in this society which dismisses marriage as unimportant and divorce as even less important, the complaint may be raised that the spouse who was treated unjustly is doomed to suffer because of the Church teaching, which means they can never remarry.  "How can the Church deny a person their happiness?"

The Church didn't deny the person their happiness.  The unfaithful spouse did that.  The Church can only say, "Christ has forbidden remarriage if the marriage is valid.  If your marriage was valid, we cannot remarry you while your spouse lives."

Remember that the Sacramental Marriage is a vow made before God to remain faithful to each other for life.  One may be unfaithful in this lifelong vow, but that person's sin does not change the fact that Christ decreed the valid marriage to be unbreakable.

In marriage, there are no longer two people, but “one flesh” (Gen 2:24). A bond is formed which endures as long as both the husband and wife live.

If He did not give us permission to break a marriage, how can we, on our own, to declare such a marriage ended and expect God, who says “I hate divorce” (Malachi 2:16), to accept it?

This is why the "how can the Church deny a person their happiness?" argument is not only wrong, but is actually an appeal to fear (that it might happen to you) and pity, which ignores the actual question: IS the marriage valid?

Appeals to Reject the Church Authority

Because the actual question is a stumbling block, many try to get around it by appealing to another authority against the Church.  They invoke Scripture or Tradition, and ignores the question: Who has the authority to interpret Scripture and Tradition?

In this article I would like to look at the invocation of the Gospel of Matthew and the so-called exceptions to the norm.

A Look at the So-called “Matthew Exception”

Some people who object to the Catholic position try to cite Matthew 5 and Matthew 19 to argue that a spouse who is victimized by an adulterous spouse may remarry. The Eastern Orthodox churches tend to hold this position, and some stricter Protestant denominations do as well. Matthew 5 reads:

^{31 }“It was also said, ‘Whoever divorces his wife must give her a bill of divorce.’

^32 But I say to you, whoever divorces his wife (unless the marriage is unlawful) causes her to commit adultery, and whoever marries a divorced woman commits adultery.

Matthew 19 reads:

^3 Some Pharisees approached him, and tested him, ^saying, “Is it lawful for a man to divorce his wife for any cause whatever?”

^4 He said in reply, “Have you not read that from the beginning the Creator ‘made them male and female’

^5 and said, ‘For this reason a man shall leave his father and mother and be joined to his wife, and the two shall become one flesh’?

^6 So they are no longer two, but one flesh. Therefore, what God has joined together, no human being must separate.”

^7 They said to him, “Then why did Moses command that the man give the woman a bill of divorce and dismiss (her)?”

^8 He said to them, “Because of the hardness of your hearts Moses allowed you to divorce your wives, but from the beginning it was not so.

^9 I say to you, whoever divorces his wife (unless the marriage is unlawful) and marries another commits adultery.”

^10 (His) disciples said to him, “If that is the case of a man with his wife, it is better not to marry.”

^11 He answered, “Not all can accept (this) word, but only those to whom that is granted.

^12 Some are incapable of marriage because they were born so; some, because they were made so by others; some, because they have renounced marriage ^for the sake of the kingdom of heaven. Whoever can accept this ought to accept it.”

The argument put forward by those who favor the so-called Matthew Exception is that Christ permitted divorce and remarriage on grounds of adultery.

A Look at the problems of the Adultery Assumption: Porneia and Moichaō

The passages of Matthew 5:32 and Matthew 19:9 are sometimes translated as "except for fornication" (KJV, ASV), sometimes technically correct but misleading “except for unchastity” (as in the RSV) and is sometimes mistranslated as "except for unfaithfulness" or the like in some of the modern semi-paraphrased versions. 

Why do I say it is a mistranslation?  Because the Greek word used in both Matthew 5 and Matthew 19 is πορνείᾳ (porneia) which is used in the sense of fornication, homosexual acts and immorality.  It is almost always used in the sense of sexual sins among the unmarried (see 1 Cor 7:2).  In contrast, the word for adultery is derived from μοιχάω (moichaō) which means to have sexual relations with another person's spouse.  Indeed, it is the word used in the above verses where Christ says the person who marries another, except in the case of πορνείᾳ, commits adultery (μοιχᾶται).

Porneia is not moichaō.  The words are specifically different in the Greek of the New Testament, and the person who wants to argue that Christ intended the “adultery exception” needs to explain why Christ did not say that: whoever divorces his wife, except for moichaō, commits moichatai.

This is especially relevant when we look at Matthew 15:19 where it says:

^19 For from the heart come evil thoughts, murder, adultery, unchastity, theft, false witness, blasphemy.

In Greek, we see what is written as “adultery, unchastity” is μοιχεῖαι, πορνεῖαι in the Greek (moicheiai, porneiai). Christ, in the Gospel of Matthew, makes a clear distinction between the two.

Another Problem with the Appeal to Matthew: Scriptural Disagreement?

There is another problem with the appeal to Matthew and the so-called exception.  That problem is that the other gospels which do not include this exception. Mark 10:11-12 reads:

^11 He said to them, “Whoever divorces his wife and marries another commits adultery against her;

^12 and if she divorces her husband and marries another, she commits adultery.”

Luke 16 reads:

^8 “Everyone who divorces his wife and marries another commits adultery, and the one who marries a woman divorced from her husband commits adultery.

So here is the problem. If one wants to argue that Matthew permits exceptions to the command of no divorce; such a view needs to be reconciled with Mark and Luke, which makes no such exception, or else admit the Scriptures contradict.  Now, is Matthew more lenient than Mark and Luke?  Or are Mark and Luke harsher than Matthew?

Either way, one would have to decide whether Matthew erred or whether Mark and Luke (and Paul), and on what basis is this to be accepted?

There is only one view which protects inerrancy of Scripture and shows there to be no conflict.  That is the recognition that Matthew was writing to a Jewish audience who were aware of the Law and the forbidding of marriage between men and women in certain degrees of relationship. 

Indeed, we see such a case in Matthew 14:3-4:

^3 Now Herod had arrested John, bound (him), and put him in prison on account of Herodias, ^the wife of his brother Philip,

^4 for John had said to him, “It is not lawful for you to have her.”

^The relationship of Herod and his brother's wife was prohibited in Leviticus 18:16 and 20:21.  In other words, it was a sinful act which God opposed. Regardless of Herod’s feelings for Herodias, their relationship was forbidden by the Law and could not be considered a valid marriage.  

The Catholic Church understands that the so-called “exception” of Matthew was not sanction of divorce and remarriage for cases of adultery, but for ending an invalid marriage and entering a real one.

This is why annulment is not a “Catholic Divorce” but rather an investigation into whether a marriage was valid to begin with. If it was not valid, then there was no marriage to begin with. If it is valid, then it quite simply exists regardless of what one or both spouses do.

The Problem of Paul for the “Matthew Exception”

1 Corinthians 7 also shows that those groups who argue for the “adultery clause” are in error. He writes:

^10 To the married, however, I give this instruction (not I, but the Lord): a wife should not separate from her husband

^11 —and if she does separate she must either remain single or become reconciled to her husband—and a husband should not divorce his wife.

Paul does not include the notion that one may remarry if the other spouse is unfaithful. Now some may try to argue that “should” means that it is not approved but permissible. However, “should” appears only in some translations (NAB, NASB, NRSV, RSV) and not at all in the Greek.

Debunking the Fallacy of amphiboly in reading Paul

There is a fallacy of amphiboly to interpret “should” as permitting. Those who argue such tend to take the definition of “should” in the sense of one of the following:

• used in a clause with ‘that’ after a main clause describing feelings.
• used in a clause with ‘that’ expressing purpose.
• (in the first person) expressing a polite request or acceptance.
• (in the first person) expressing a conjecture or hope

(Soanes, C., & Stevenson, A. (2004). Concise Oxford English dictionary (11th ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.)

However, these are not the main definitions for “should.” The word “Should” is derived from shall (remember the Ten Commandments with “Thou shall not…”) and the primary definition is actually “Used to indicate obligation, duty, or correctness.” (Soanes, C., & Stevenson, A. (2004). Concise Oxford English dictionary (11th ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.”)

For Paul, Porneia and Moichaō are not the same thing

Another problem Paul poses for the “Matthew Exception” argument and the claim that porneia refers to adultery is the fact that Paul uses Porneia in 1 Cor. 7:1 when he says:

^1 Now in regard to the matters about which you wrote: “It is a good thing for a man not to touch a woman,”

^2 but because of cases of immorality every man should have his own wife, and every woman her own husband.

Immorality is πορνείας (porneias) in the Greek. If Adultery is “voluntary sexual intercourse between a married person and a person who is not their husband or wife” then it follows that marriage cannot prevent adultery, simply because adultery presupposes the existence of marriage. Indeed, Paul would be speaking nonsense.

Conclusion

I believe we have demonstrated here that the invocation of Matthew 5 and Matthew 19 to justify remarriage after divorce in the case of adultery is one which must ignore the whole of Scripture and cite it selectively.

In my next article I will look at the appeal to the Early Christian Fathers (known as the Patristics) which some attempt.

Reflections on Divorce, Remarriage and the Church (Part I): Did Matthew Make an Exception?

Preliminary Disclaimer

This article is on the subject of seeking to end a valid marriage on the grounds of adultery by way of rejecting the authority of the Church.  It is not a commentary on annulments.  Nor is it a judgment on those who seek them. 

I do not claim the authority to make judgments on whether the Church should or should not grant  an annulment in any individual case.  A person wondering if they have grounds for annulment should contact their parish or diocese for information.

My only intent for this article is to explain why certain attacks against the Church on this subject are in error.

Introduction: Appeal to Emotion to challenge the Church

While the recent abuse stories are the most headline grabbing attacks on the Church, there are always the tried-and-true attacks on the Church from within and without, which essentially seeks to portray the Church as “heartless” because she believes she cannot compromise on certain issues. Whether it is an issue like contraception, or divorce, or abortion or so-called “gay marriage” (it is interesting to note that all these objections tend to focus on the area of sexual ethics) the position is presented that the Church is a heartless bureaucratic institution which clings to “rules” which Christ would not approve of.

Usually such a position is demonstrated with either the appeal to fear fallacy or the appeal to pity fallacy. An example is given (such as a family with “too many children” or the “abandoned spouse” or the woman with a “health condition” or two people “who truly love each other”) to whom we are supposed to have sympathy for. Because they are in a situation where the Church must say “No,” the argument is the Church is “cruel” in doing so.

Fallacies don’t prove anything

The problem is, this doesn’t prove the Church is wrong. Indeed, the attack against the Church is based on the unwarranted assumption that God is primarily interested in our material well-being, and that the concern for our spiritual well-being is unimportant.

The objection tends to run along the lines of:

1. The situation I am in is harmful because it makes me unhappy

2. God does not want to harm us

3. Therefore this situation which makes me unhappy is against God's will.

In certain areas of Church moral teaching, we see this sort of appeal.  "God knows we can't afford to have more children right now.  The Church condemns contraception.  Therefore the Church teaching is against God's will."  Or "God doesn't want me to be alone and my spouse abandoned me.  The Church forbids remarriage after divorce.  Therefore the Church is wrong."

Denying Happiness? Why this argument is missing the point

The problem with these arguments is that it frames the issue in the wrong way.

Because the dissent against the Church on the issue of Remarriage is so common, one needs to look at the issues and why the attacks against the Church fundamentally miss the point and negate that which is binding about marriage.

The problem of the objection against Church teaching is that it confuses the cause of the situation with the Church teaching on the situation.  For example, if a person in a valid marriage is divorced, the Church teaching is that so long as both partners live, they must reconcile or remain single.

Now in this society which dismisses marriage as unimportant and divorce as even less important, the complaint may be raised that the spouse who was treated unjustly is doomed to suffer because of the Church teaching, which means they can never remarry.  "How can the Church deny a person their happiness?"

The Church didn't deny the person their happiness.  The unfaithful spouse did that.  The Church can only say, "Christ has forbidden remarriage if the marriage is valid.  If your marriage was valid, we cannot remarry you while your spouse lives."

Remember that the Sacramental Marriage is a vow made before God to remain faithful to each other for life.  One may be unfaithful in this lifelong vow, but that person's sin does not change the fact that Christ decreed the valid marriage to be unbreakable.

In marriage, there are no longer two people, but “one flesh” (Gen 2:24). A bond is formed which endures as long as both the husband and wife live.

If He did not give us permission to break a marriage, how can we, on our own, to declare such a marriage ended and expect God, who says “I hate divorce” (Malachi 2:16), to accept it?

This is why the "how can the Church deny a person their happiness?" argument is not only wrong, but is actually an appeal to fear (that it might happen to you) and pity, which ignores the actual question: IS the marriage valid?

Appeals to Reject the Church Authority

Because the actual question is a stumbling block, many try to get around it by appealing to another authority against the Church.  They invoke Scripture or Tradition, and ignores the question: Who has the authority to interpret Scripture and Tradition?

In this article I would like to look at the invocation of the Gospel of Matthew and the so-called exceptions to the norm.

A Look at the So-called “Matthew Exception”

Some people who object to the Catholic position try to cite Matthew 5 and Matthew 19 to argue that a spouse who is victimized by an adulterous spouse may remarry. The Eastern Orthodox churches tend to hold this position, and some stricter Protestant denominations do as well. Matthew 5 reads:

^{31 }“It was also said, ‘Whoever divorces his wife must give her a bill of divorce.’

^32 But I say to you, whoever divorces his wife (unless the marriage is unlawful) causes her to commit adultery, and whoever marries a divorced woman commits adultery.

Matthew 19 reads:

^3 Some Pharisees approached him, and tested him, ^saying, “Is it lawful for a man to divorce his wife for any cause whatever?”

^4 He said in reply, “Have you not read that from the beginning the Creator ‘made them male and female’

^5 and said, ‘For this reason a man shall leave his father and mother and be joined to his wife, and the two shall become one flesh’?

^6 So they are no longer two, but one flesh. Therefore, what God has joined together, no human being must separate.”

^7 They said to him, “Then why did Moses command that the man give the woman a bill of divorce and dismiss (her)?”

^8 He said to them, “Because of the hardness of your hearts Moses allowed you to divorce your wives, but from the beginning it was not so.

^9 I say to you, whoever divorces his wife (unless the marriage is unlawful) and marries another commits adultery.”

^10 (His) disciples said to him, “If that is the case of a man with his wife, it is better not to marry.”

^11 He answered, “Not all can accept (this) word, but only those to whom that is granted.

^12 Some are incapable of marriage because they were born so; some, because they were made so by others; some, because they have renounced marriage ^for the sake of the kingdom of heaven. Whoever can accept this ought to accept it.”

The argument put forward by those who favor the so-called Matthew Exception is that Christ permitted divorce and remarriage on grounds of adultery.

A Look at the problems of the Adultery Assumption: Porneia and Moichaō

The passages of Matthew 5:32 and Matthew 19:9 are sometimes translated as "except for fornication" (KJV, ASV), sometimes technically correct but misleading “except for unchastity” (as in the RSV) and is sometimes mistranslated as "except for unfaithfulness" or the like in some of the modern semi-paraphrased versions. 

Why do I say it is a mistranslation?  Because the Greek word used in both Matthew 5 and Matthew 19 is πορνείᾳ (porneia) which is used in the sense of fornication, homosexual acts and immorality.  It is almost always used in the sense of sexual sins among the unmarried (see 1 Cor 7:2).  In contrast, the word for adultery is derived from μοιχάω (moichaō) which means to have sexual relations with another person's spouse.  Indeed, it is the word used in the above verses where Christ says the person who marries another, except in the case of πορνείᾳ, commits adultery (μοιχᾶται).

Porneia is not moichaō.  The words are specifically different in the Greek of the New Testament, and the person who wants to argue that Christ intended the “adultery exception” needs to explain why Christ did not say that: whoever divorces his wife, except for moichaō, commits moichatai.

This is especially relevant when we look at Matthew 15:19 where it says:

^19 For from the heart come evil thoughts, murder, adultery, unchastity, theft, false witness, blasphemy.

In Greek, we see what is written as “adultery, unchastity” is μοιχεῖαι, πορνεῖαι in the Greek (moicheiai, porneiai). Christ, in the Gospel of Matthew, makes a clear distinction between the two.

Another Problem with the Appeal to Matthew: Scriptural Disagreement?

There is another problem with the appeal to Matthew and the so-called exception.  That problem is that the other gospels which do not include this exception. Mark 10:11-12 reads:

^11 He said to them, “Whoever divorces his wife and marries another commits adultery against her;

^12 and if she divorces her husband and marries another, she commits adultery.”

Luke 16 reads:

^8 “Everyone who divorces his wife and marries another commits adultery, and the one who marries a woman divorced from her husband commits adultery.

So here is the problem. If one wants to argue that Matthew permits exceptions to the command of no divorce; such a view needs to be reconciled with Mark and Luke, which makes no such exception, or else admit the Scriptures contradict.  Now, is Matthew more lenient than Mark and Luke?  Or are Mark and Luke harsher than Matthew?

Either way, one would have to decide whether Matthew erred or whether Mark and Luke (and Paul), and on what basis is this to be accepted?

There is only one view which protects inerrancy of Scripture and shows there to be no conflict.  That is the recognition that Matthew was writing to a Jewish audience who were aware of the Law and the forbidding of marriage between men and women in certain degrees of relationship. 

Indeed, we see such a case in Matthew 14:3-4:

^3 Now Herod had arrested John, bound (him), and put him in prison on account of Herodias, ^the wife of his brother Philip,

^4 for John had said to him, “It is not lawful for you to have her.”

^The relationship of Herod and his brother's wife was prohibited in Leviticus 18:16 and 20:21.  In other words, it was a sinful act which God opposed. Regardless of Herod’s feelings for Herodias, their relationship was forbidden by the Law and could not be considered a valid marriage.  

The Catholic Church understands that the so-called “exception” of Matthew was not sanction of divorce and remarriage for cases of adultery, but for ending an invalid marriage and entering a real one.

This is why annulment is not a “Catholic Divorce” but rather an investigation into whether a marriage was valid to begin with. If it was not valid, then there was no marriage to begin with. If it is valid, then it quite simply exists regardless of what one or both spouses do.

The Problem of Paul for the “Matthew Exception”

1 Corinthians 7 also shows that those groups who argue for the “adultery clause” are in error. He writes:

^10 To the married, however, I give this instruction (not I, but the Lord): a wife should not separate from her husband

^11 —and if she does separate she must either remain single or become reconciled to her husband—and a husband should not divorce his wife.

Paul does not include the notion that one may remarry if the other spouse is unfaithful. Now some may try to argue that “should” means that it is not approved but permissible. However, “should” appears only in some translations (NAB, NASB, NRSV, RSV) and not at all in the Greek.

Debunking the Fallacy of amphiboly in reading Paul

There is a fallacy of amphiboly to interpret “should” as permitting. Those who argue such tend to take the definition of “should” in the sense of one of the following:

• used in a clause with ‘that’ after a main clause describing feelings.
• used in a clause with ‘that’ expressing purpose.
• (in the first person) expressing a polite request or acceptance.
• (in the first person) expressing a conjecture or hope

(Soanes, C., & Stevenson, A. (2004). Concise Oxford English dictionary (11th ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.)

However, these are not the main definitions for “should.” The word “Should” is derived from shall (remember the Ten Commandments with “Thou shall not…”) and the primary definition is actually “Used to indicate obligation, duty, or correctness.” (Soanes, C., & Stevenson, A. (2004). Concise Oxford English dictionary (11th ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.”)

For Paul, Porneia and Moichaō are not the same thing

Another problem Paul poses for the “Matthew Exception” argument and the claim that porneia refers to adultery is the fact that Paul uses Porneia in 1 Cor. 7:1 when he says:

^1 Now in regard to the matters about which you wrote: “It is a good thing for a man not to touch a woman,”

^2 but because of cases of immorality every man should have his own wife, and every woman her own husband.

Immorality is πορνείας (porneias) in the Greek. If Adultery is “voluntary sexual intercourse between a married person and a person who is not their husband or wife” then it follows that marriage cannot prevent adultery, simply because adultery presupposes the existence of marriage. Indeed, Paul would be speaking nonsense.

Conclusion

I believe we have demonstrated here that the invocation of Matthew 5 and Matthew 19 to justify remarriage after divorce in the case of adultery is one which must ignore the whole of Scripture and cite it selectively.

In my next article I will look at the appeal to the Early Christian Fathers (known as the Patristics) which some attempt.

Shouldn't EVERY Day Be a Day of Reason?

Source: CNSNews.com - Atheist Group Calls on Obama to Endorse ‘National Day of Reason' Instead of 'National Day of Prayer'

You have to shake your head with the antics of certain so-called "New Atheists."  In calling for a "National Day of Reason," it is of course designed to be a slap in the face of religious believers by implying they are not reasonable.  Unfortunately they really ought to have thought this through.

As a believer, who was inspired by Sts. Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, and the philosophers they found reasonable (Socrates and Aristotle) and by modern philosophers such as Peter Kreeft, I find that every day one has to use reason in considering the attacks of the faith.

Unfortunately, I think Roy Speckhardt of the American Humanist Association does not come across as reasonable as he thinks he is.

He objects to a National Day of Prayer, saying:

With the religious right's influence in Congress, and with the threat to our Judiciary looming large, there has never been as important a moment in which to affirm our commitment to the Constitutional separation of religion and government, and to celebrate Reason as the guiding principle of our secular democracy.

During the past year we have witnessed the intrusion of religious ideology into all spheres of or government with such assaults on the wall separating church and state as:

• Faith-based initiatives in federal agencies that give preferential treatment to religious organizations which proselytize and employ discriminatory hiring practices;
• Restrictions on important scientific research on the basis of religious objections;
• Attempts to introduce biblical creationism and its alter-ego "Intelligent Design" into our public school science curricula;
• The appointment of judges who willingly place their religious beliefs above our laws;
• Battles over the display of the Ten Commandments and other overtly religious icons in schools and on courthouses;
• Religiously motivated restrictions on access to reproductive services and information

The irony is that he goes on to say (emphasis added):

What can you do to demonstrate your support for a Day of Reason?

Plan a special event to commemorate the NDR, such as a protest demonstration, special lecture, or social gathering;

• Work to have a Day of Reason proclaimed by your state or local government;
• Hold a press conference for your local media to promote respect for the separation of religion and government, and to draw attention to the many breaches of that principle during recent months;
• Organize a letter-writing campaign urging your elected officials to support the separation of religion and government;
• Visit the National Day of Reason web site to sign-up as an endorser, to view planned events, or to read some of the media coverage from previous years.

It seems to be unreasonable to object to special privileges to religion and imposing of values on one hand, while insisting on what is effectively the same thing.  If it is a breach to have the government declare a National Day of Prayer, it logically follows that to insist on a day which is effectively a rejection of religion is also a breach.

If Speckhardt wishes to argue that secularism and atheism is true, and that such a day reflects reality, then let him build a reasoned case and present it to be reviewed instead of engaging in a Bulverism by declaring that it is already established that religion is false.  Let him demonstrate as true that religion and reason are separate.  Without doing so, Speckhardt is Begging the Question, which is not logical… logic of course being a part of reason.

If government is not to endorse any sort of faith based view, then let us see the AHA demonstrate why we should consider their views to be based on Reason and not a sort of faith or ideology in itself.

We don't need A National Day of Reason… we need 365 (366 in Leap Years) Days of Reason, independent of whether it is personal or national or global.

Shouldn't EVERY Day Be a Day of Reason?

Source: CNSNews.com - Atheist Group Calls on Obama to Endorse ‘National Day of Reason' Instead of 'National Day of Prayer'

You have to shake your head with the antics of certain so-called "New Atheists."  In calling for a "National Day of Reason," it is of course designed to be a slap in the face of religious believers by implying they are not reasonable.  Unfortunately they really ought to have thought this through.

As a believer, who was inspired by Sts. Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, and the philosophers they found reasonable (Socrates and Aristotle) and by modern philosophers such as Peter Kreeft, I find that every day one has to use reason in considering the attacks of the faith.

Unfortunately, I think Roy Speckhardt of the American Humanist Association does not come across as reasonable as he thinks he is.

He objects to a National Day of Prayer, saying:

With the religious right's influence in Congress, and with the threat to our Judiciary looming large, there has never been as important a moment in which to affirm our commitment to the Constitutional separation of religion and government, and to celebrate Reason as the guiding principle of our secular democracy.

During the past year we have witnessed the intrusion of religious ideology into all spheres of or government with such assaults on the wall separating church and state as:

• Faith-based initiatives in federal agencies that give preferential treatment to religious organizations which proselytize and employ discriminatory hiring practices;
• Restrictions on important scientific research on the basis of religious objections;
• Attempts to introduce biblical creationism and its alter-ego "Intelligent Design" into our public school science curricula;
• The appointment of judges who willingly place their religious beliefs above our laws;
• Battles over the display of the Ten Commandments and other overtly religious icons in schools and on courthouses;
• Religiously motivated restrictions on access to reproductive services and information

The irony is that he goes on to say (emphasis added):

What can you do to demonstrate your support for a Day of Reason?

Plan a special event to commemorate the NDR, such as a protest demonstration, special lecture, or social gathering;

• Work to have a Day of Reason proclaimed by your state or local government;
• Hold a press conference for your local media to promote respect for the separation of religion and government, and to draw attention to the many breaches of that principle during recent months;
• Organize a letter-writing campaign urging your elected officials to support the separation of religion and government;
• Visit the National Day of Reason web site to sign-up as an endorser, to view planned events, or to read some of the media coverage from previous years.

It seems to be unreasonable to object to special privileges to religion and imposing of values on one hand, while insisting on what is effectively the same thing.  If it is a breach to have the government declare a National Day of Prayer, it logically follows that to insist on a day which is effectively a rejection of religion is also a breach.

If Speckhardt wishes to argue that secularism and atheism is true, and that such a day reflects reality, then let him build a reasoned case and present it to be reviewed instead of engaging in a Bulverism by declaring that it is already established that religion is false.  Let him demonstrate as true that religion and reason are separate.  Without doing so, Speckhardt is Begging the Question, which is not logical… logic of course being a part of reason.

If government is not to endorse any sort of faith based view, then let us see the AHA demonstrate why we should consider their views to be based on Reason and not a sort of faith or ideology in itself.

We don't need A National Day of Reason… we need 365 (366 in Leap Years) Days of Reason, independent of whether it is personal or national or global.

Reflections on The Constitution, The Supreme Court and Justice

Much of the political debate going around today is based on the idea that because the Constitution permits a thing, there can be no complaint against it.  Setting aside for the moment specific issues of dispute in America, the theory ignores one crucial question:

Can the Constitution (or an interpretation of it) err or be unjust?

I believe the answer can clearly be yes to both.  I recall in High School civics class that the Constitution can be amended if a problem is perceived.  Certainly before 1865, the Constitution was flawed in that it denied citizenship to certain parts of the population simply on the basis of the color of their skin.

This shows the problem when certain politicians rally around the "Constitutional" Right of the woman to choose [abortion].  The right may be decreed constitutional by the Supreme Court, but neither it, nor the right to privacy it is based on can be found in the Constitution.

If the interpreters of the Constitution are unjust, it follows that the interpretations they give can be unjust.  This kind of rhetoric goes on frequently.  Today, there is a dispute over whether Obamacare is constitutional.  Nine years ago, there was a dispute over whether the Supreme Court "unjustly installed" George W. Bush as president.

What this demonstrates is [Regardless of whether the charges are true or not], we do have interpreters of the US Constitution whose decisions are binding and not able to be appealed.  If they are unjust in their decisions, there is very little we can do to stop them.

This isn't mere theory.  The Supreme Court has made some historically bad decisions and have been forced to contradict previous precedent, such as the Dred Scott case and Plessy vs. Ferguson.

I believe this shows that the Supreme Court can give an interpretation which they call Constitutional, but is also unjust.

This demonstrates that to invoke the Constitutionality of a law is no evidence as to whether or not it is just.

On Justice

However, justice in law is what separates the good forms of government from the immoral forms of government, and here the person who argues against any moral absolutes have hamstrung themselves when opposing injustice.

Justice can be defined as giving to another their due, and behaving in right conduct with other people.  All human persons are considered to have human rights simply on the basis of their being human.  Each person is entitled to the due of not being treated in a subhuman condition.  In America we have in the Bill of Rights which assumes all people have certain rights.

The Catholic Church speaks of justice between men as follows:

1929 Social justice can be obtained only in respecting the transcendent dignity of man. The person represents the ultimate end of society, which is ordered to him:

What is at stake is the dignity of the human person, whose defense and promotion have been entrusted to us by the Creator, and to whom the men and women at every moment of history are strictly and responsibly in debt.³⁵

1930 Respect for the human person entails respect for the rights that flow from his dignity as a creature. These rights are prior to society and must be recognized by it. They are the basis of the moral legitimacy of every authority: by flouting them, or refusing to recognize them in its positive legislation, a society undermines its own moral legitimacy.³⁶ If it does not respect them, authority can rely only on force or violence to obtain obedience from its subjects. It is the Church's role to remind men of good will of these rights and to distinguish them from unwarranted or false claims.

In other words, because a person is human they possess certain rights independent of the government, and no government can take them away without being unjust.  Moreover, any government which denies these rights lacks moral legitimacy to their rule, and can only use force to make their decrees followed.

The Difference Between the Constitution and Justice

Whether or not the Constitution, or its interpretation, can be considered as possessing moral authority depends on whether it respects the human person or not.  If it does not respect the human person, the law may be binding by force, but it is not a law which we are morally obligated to follow, and in fact are morally obligated to oppose.

The Abortion Example

In 1973, the Supreme Court decreed abortion legal, and since then we have been told that it is based in the Constitutional Right to Privacy, which is not in the Constitution, and was not described as a right until 1965, in Griswold v. Connecticut.  This invokes the Ninth Amendment, which is a circular argument which one can dismantle with a reductio ad absurdum.  [The Constitution doesn't say I can't murder anyone either, therefore I have a constitutional right to do so].

Now, one can argue that the right to privacy is a basic right which precedes the Constitution.  However, this overlooks a crucial consideration: Are the unborn human persons?  If so, then their right to life precedes the Constitutional Supreme Court Right to abortion.

The Supreme Court decision, Roe v. Wade entirely ignores this consideration, when it declares:

3. State criminal abortion laws, like those involved here, that except from criminality only a life-saving procedure on the mother's behalf without regard to the stage of her pregnancy and other interests involved violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which protects against state action the right to privacy, including a woman's qualified right to terminate her pregnancy.

This is entirely a circular argument, which assumes what it needs to prove: That a woman does in fact have the right to terminate a pregnancy.  It calls the unborn a potential life, but this is to be proven, not assumed to be true.

Indeed, without proving the fact that the fetus is not a person, the Supreme Court appears to have violated the 14th amendment:

1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. (Emphasis added)

If the assumption that the fetus is merely a potential human being is false, then the Supreme Court has created a situation where the unborn are denied the equal protection under the law.

The Roe v. Wade decision relies on an irrelevant appeal to past decisions of legal precedent, which selectively chooses certain examples and ignores others.  The reason it is an irrelevant appeal is that many of the precedents they cite are based on the scientifically erroneous ideas of quickening of the fetus, ignoring later medical advances.  From this we see the argument that since the actual forbidding of abortion in America was based on the fact that outright forbidding of abortion did not exist until the 19th century in America.

However, this is an argument from silence.  "We don't know of laws forbidding abortion until the 19th century.  Therefore it was permissible before then."  That laws were made in the 19th century does not prove that abortion was acceptable before.  Positive evidence that the nation, prior to the 19th century, sanctioned abortion is necessary.

Even from this, it does not follow that abortion is right.  To judge abortion as being morally neutral, it has to be established that the fetus is not alive.  If the fetus is a human person, it contains human rights which precede the laws of the United States.

The Quadrilemma of abortion

A right to abortion requires us to create some categories.  First, whether or not the fetus is a human person.  It either is or it is not.  Second, we need to determine whether we know this to be true.  This leaves us with four categories:

1. The unborn is a human person and we know it.
2. The unborn is not a human person and we know it
3. The unborn is a human person and we do not know it
4. The unborn is not a human person and we do not know it

In these four cases, we have three levels of guilt or innocence.

1. In the case of us knowing the unborn is a human person, government sanctioned abortion is the murder of a human person.
2. In the case of us knowing the unborn is not a human person, there is no problem with abortion.
3. In not knowing whether or not the unborn is a human person (cases 3 and 4), abortion becomes a reckless, grossly negligent act.

We can demonstrate these cases with another scenario.  You and a friend are deer hunting, and get separated.  You hear motion in the bush.  There are four possibilities:

1. The movement is caused by your friend and you know it
2. The movement is caused by a deer and you know it
3. The movement is caused by your friend and you do not know it
4. The movement is caused by a deer and you do not know it

When is it legitimate to shoot?  Only in case two.  Why?

1. In case 1, shooting when you know it is a person is willed murder
2. In case 2, shooting when you verified you can shoot safely is morally acceptable
3. In case 3, you are guilty of gross negligence and manslaughter at the very least
4. In case 4, you are still guilty of gross negligence.

Yet, instead of proving when the human person begins, the Supreme Court acts with gross negligence.  it "fires into the bush" without verifying the target, when it argues:

A. The appellee and certain amici argue that the fetus is a "person" within the language and meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. In support of this, they outline at length and in detail the well-known facts of fetal development. If this suggestion of personhood is established, the appellant's case, of course, collapses, [410 U.S. 113, 157] for the fetus' right to life would then be guaranteed specifically by the Amendment. The appellant conceded as much on reargument. 51 On the other hand, the appellee conceded on reargument 52 that no case could be cited that holds that a fetus is a person within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Whether or not past law has made a statement on whether or not the fetus is a person has no bearing on whether the fetus IS a human person.  To assume that the fetus is not a human person based on interpretations of the 14th Amendment is an evasion of the issue, when it says:

All this, together with our observation, supra, that throughout the major portion of the 19th century prevailing legal abortion practices were far freer than they are today, persuades us that the word "person," as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn.

This is an appeal to irrelevant authority fallacy.  Does the lack of laws that declare the fetus a person make it so?

Dangerous Precedents

Certain nations, including the United States, have at certain times determined that certain human beings were not persons on the basis of their ethnicity.  The most extreme example is that of Nazi Germany with its claiming that Jews and Slavs were subhumans which lacked human rights.  We are of course horrified by the actions the Germans justified by a legal claim.  Through a legal ruling, human persons were terribly mistreated.

Now of course Nazi Germany was an extreme example.  However, the United States once considered the blacks to be less than fully human, and such a view was upheld by the Supreme Court.  Under the logic of Roe v. Wade past precedent could be used to deny any African American was a "human person."  After all, before 1865, there were no laws which held that view.  It instead took a war and some amendments to overturn the bad logic of the Supreme Court.

Constitutional Is Not the Same as Just: QED

We are back to the beginning, and the conclusion is clear.  Just because the Supreme Court or the Constitution says a thing is constitutional has no bearing on whether a thing is just.  So despite what the Supreme Court says, it still must be assessed as to whether it is just or not.  If it is not just, it must be opposed.

Yet, the whole problem is a thing is not defended as just, it is merely called "Constitutional" as if that was all the sanction which was needed.

Unfortunately, in America, there is little recourse to an unjust ruling by the Supreme Court.  It is the state legislatures which can vote for a proposed amendment (which first requires 2/3 of both House and Senate to vote in favor of a proposed amendment), not the people (unless the states call ratifying conventions… which happened once).

So where does this leave the Christian who feels he must oppose an unjust ruling?

An Unjust Law is not a Law

One may want to ask: "How can you advocate breaking some laws and obeying others?" The answer lies in the fact that there are two types of laws: just and unjust. I would be the first to advocate obeying just laws. One has not only a legal but a moral responsibility to obey just laws. Conversely, one has a moral responsibility to disobey unjust laws. I would agree with St. Augustine that "an unjust law is no law at all"

Now, what is the difference between the two? How does one determine whether a law is just or unjust? A just law is a man-made code that squares with the moral law or the law of God. An unjust law is a code that is out of harmony with the moral law. To put it in the terms of St. Thomas Aquinas: An unjust law is a human law that is not rooted in eternal law and natural law. Any law that uplifts human personality is just. Any law that degrades human personality is unjust.

—Martin Luther King Jr.  Letter from a Birmingham Jail

This is ultimately what must put the Christian unwillingly in conflict with the government of the United States at times.  When the government decrees that it is permissible to degrade the human person, we must speak out against it, not bowing the knee to the unjust law… even if it comes from the Supreme Court or the Constitution itself.

However, there is a limit to what we can do.  If it comes to a choice between doing evil and suffering evil, we must choose the suffering of evil, as we may not choose an evil means to achieve the desired end.  Nor can we participate with the evil law.

So, in short, our opposition to injustice must be done in keeping with making a Christian witness.

Reflections on The Constitution, The Supreme Court and Justice

Much of the political debate going around today is based on the idea that because the Constitution permits a thing, there can be no complaint against it.  Setting aside for the moment specific issues of dispute in America, the theory ignores one crucial question:

Can the Constitution (or an interpretation of it) err or be unjust?

I believe the answer can clearly be yes to both.  I recall in High School civics class that the Constitution can be amended if a problem is perceived.  Certainly before 1865, the Constitution was flawed in that it denied citizenship to certain parts of the population simply on the basis of the color of their skin.

This shows the problem when certain politicians rally around the "Constitutional" Right of the woman to choose [abortion].  The right may be decreed constitutional by the Supreme Court, but neither it, nor the right to privacy it is based on can be found in the Constitution.

If the interpreters of the Constitution are unjust, it follows that the interpretations they give can be unjust.  This kind of rhetoric goes on frequently.  Today, there is a dispute over whether Obamacare is constitutional.  Nine years ago, there was a dispute over whether the Supreme Court "unjustly installed" George W. Bush as president.

What this demonstrates is [Regardless of whether the charges are true or not], we do have interpreters of the US Constitution whose decisions are binding and not able to be appealed.  If they are unjust in their decisions, there is very little we can do to stop them.

This isn't mere theory.  The Supreme Court has made some historically bad decisions and have been forced to contradict previous precedent, such as the Dred Scott case and Plessy vs. Ferguson.

I believe this shows that the Supreme Court can give an interpretation which they call Constitutional, but is also unjust.

This demonstrates that to invoke the Constitutionality of a law is no evidence as to whether or not it is just.

On Justice

However, justice in law is what separates the good forms of government from the immoral forms of government, and here the person who argues against any moral absolutes have hamstrung themselves when opposing injustice.

Justice can be defined as giving to another their due, and behaving in right conduct with other people.  All human persons are considered to have human rights simply on the basis of their being human.  Each person is entitled to the due of not being treated in a subhuman condition.  In America we have in the Bill of Rights which assumes all people have certain rights.

The Catholic Church speaks of justice between men as follows:

1929 Social justice can be obtained only in respecting the transcendent dignity of man. The person represents the ultimate end of society, which is ordered to him:

What is at stake is the dignity of the human person, whose defense and promotion have been entrusted to us by the Creator, and to whom the men and women at every moment of history are strictly and responsibly in debt.³⁵

1930 Respect for the human person entails respect for the rights that flow from his dignity as a creature. These rights are prior to society and must be recognized by it. They are the basis of the moral legitimacy of every authority: by flouting them, or refusing to recognize them in its positive legislation, a society undermines its own moral legitimacy.³⁶ If it does not respect them, authority can rely only on force or violence to obtain obedience from its subjects. It is the Church's role to remind men of good will of these rights and to distinguish them from unwarranted or false claims.

In other words, because a person is human they possess certain rights independent of the government, and no government can take them away without being unjust.  Moreover, any government which denies these rights lacks moral legitimacy to their rule, and can only use force to make their decrees followed.

The Difference Between the Constitution and Justice

Whether or not the Constitution, or its interpretation, can be considered as possessing moral authority depends on whether it respects the human person or not.  If it does not respect the human person, the law may be binding by force, but it is not a law which we are morally obligated to follow, and in fact are morally obligated to oppose.

The Abortion Example

In 1973, the Supreme Court decreed abortion legal, and since then we have been told that it is based in the Constitutional Right to Privacy, which is not in the Constitution, and was not described as a right until 1965, in Griswold v. Connecticut.  This invokes the Ninth Amendment, which is a circular argument which one can dismantle with a reductio ad absurdum.  [The Constitution doesn't say I can't murder anyone either, therefore I have a constitutional right to do so].

Now, one can argue that the right to privacy is a basic right which precedes the Constitution.  However, this overlooks a crucial consideration: Are the unborn human persons?  If so, then their right to life precedes the Constitutional Supreme Court Right to abortion.

The Supreme Court decision, Roe v. Wade entirely ignores this consideration, when it declares:

3. State criminal abortion laws, like those involved here, that except from criminality only a life-saving procedure on the mother's behalf without regard to the stage of her pregnancy and other interests involved violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which protects against state action the right to privacy, including a woman's qualified right to terminate her pregnancy.

This is entirely a circular argument, which assumes what it needs to prove: That a woman does in fact have the right to terminate a pregnancy.  It calls the unborn a potential life, but this is to be proven, not assumed to be true.

Indeed, without proving the fact that the fetus is not a person, the Supreme Court appears to have violated the 14th amendment:

1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. (Emphasis added)

If the assumption that the fetus is merely a potential human being is false, then the Supreme Court has created a situation where the unborn are denied the equal protection under the law.

The Roe v. Wade decision relies on an irrelevant appeal to past decisions of legal precedent, which selectively chooses certain examples and ignores others.  The reason it is an irrelevant appeal is that many of the precedents they cite are based on the scientifically erroneous ideas of quickening of the fetus, ignoring later medical advances.  From this we see the argument that since the actual forbidding of abortion in America was based on the fact that outright forbidding of abortion did not exist until the 19th century in America.

However, this is an argument from silence.  "We don't know of laws forbidding abortion until the 19th century.  Therefore it was permissible before then."  That laws were made in the 19th century does not prove that abortion was acceptable before.  Positive evidence that the nation, prior to the 19th century, sanctioned abortion is necessary.

Even from this, it does not follow that abortion is right.  To judge abortion as being morally neutral, it has to be established that the fetus is not alive.  If the fetus is a human person, it contains human rights which precede the laws of the United States.

The Quadrilemma of abortion

A right to abortion requires us to create some categories.  First, whether or not the fetus is a human person.  It either is or it is not.  Second, we need to determine whether we know this to be true.  This leaves us with four categories:

1. The unborn is a human person and we know it.
2. The unborn is not a human person and we know it
3. The unborn is a human person and we do not know it
4. The unborn is not a human person and we do not know it

In these four cases, we have three levels of guilt or innocence.

1. In the case of us knowing the unborn is a human person, government sanctioned abortion is the murder of a human person.
2. In the case of us knowing the unborn is not a human person, there is no problem with abortion.
3. In not knowing whether or not the unborn is a human person (cases 3 and 4), abortion becomes a reckless, grossly negligent act.

We can demonstrate these cases with another scenario.  You and a friend are deer hunting, and get separated.  You hear motion in the bush.  There are four possibilities:

1. The movement is caused by your friend and you know it
2. The movement is caused by a deer and you know it
3. The movement is caused by your friend and you do not know it
4. The movement is caused by a deer and you do not know it

When is it legitimate to shoot?  Only in case two.  Why?

1. In case 1, shooting when you know it is a person is willed murder
2. In case 2, shooting when you verified you can shoot safely is morally acceptable
3. In case 3, you are guilty of gross negligence and manslaughter at the very least
4. In case 4, you are still guilty of gross negligence.

Yet, instead of proving when the human person begins, the Supreme Court acts with gross negligence.  it "fires into the bush" without verifying the target, when it argues:

A. The appellee and certain amici argue that the fetus is a "person" within the language and meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. In support of this, they outline at length and in detail the well-known facts of fetal development. If this suggestion of personhood is established, the appellant's case, of course, collapses, [410 U.S. 113, 157] for the fetus' right to life would then be guaranteed specifically by the Amendment. The appellant conceded as much on reargument. 51 On the other hand, the appellee conceded on reargument 52 that no case could be cited that holds that a fetus is a person within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Whether or not past law has made a statement on whether or not the fetus is a person has no bearing on whether the fetus IS a human person.  To assume that the fetus is not a human person based on interpretations of the 14th Amendment is an evasion of the issue, when it says:

All this, together with our observation, supra, that throughout the major portion of the 19th century prevailing legal abortion practices were far freer than they are today, persuades us that the word "person," as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn.

This is an appeal to irrelevant authority fallacy.  Does the lack of laws that declare the fetus a person make it so?

Dangerous Precedents

Certain nations, including the United States, have at certain times determined that certain human beings were not persons on the basis of their ethnicity.  The most extreme example is that of Nazi Germany with its claiming that Jews and Slavs were subhumans which lacked human rights.  We are of course horrified by the actions the Germans justified by a legal claim.  Through a legal ruling, human persons were terribly mistreated.

Now of course Nazi Germany was an extreme example.  However, the United States once considered the blacks to be less than fully human, and such a view was upheld by the Supreme Court.  Under the logic of Roe v. Wade past precedent could be used to deny any African American was a "human person."  After all, before 1865, there were no laws which held that view.  It instead took a war and some amendments to overturn the bad logic of the Supreme Court.

Constitutional Is Not the Same as Just: QED

We are back to the beginning, and the conclusion is clear.  Just because the Supreme Court or the Constitution says a thing is constitutional has no bearing on whether a thing is just.  So despite what the Supreme Court says, it still must be assessed as to whether it is just or not.  If it is not just, it must be opposed.

Yet, the whole problem is a thing is not defended as just, it is merely called "Constitutional" as if that was all the sanction which was needed.

Unfortunately, in America, there is little recourse to an unjust ruling by the Supreme Court.  It is the state legislatures which can vote for a proposed amendment (which first requires 2/3 of both House and Senate to vote in favor of a proposed amendment), not the people (unless the states call ratifying conventions… which happened once).

So where does this leave the Christian who feels he must oppose an unjust ruling?

An Unjust Law is not a Law

One may want to ask: "How can you advocate breaking some laws and obeying others?" The answer lies in the fact that there are two types of laws: just and unjust. I would be the first to advocate obeying just laws. One has not only a legal but a moral responsibility to obey just laws. Conversely, one has a moral responsibility to disobey unjust laws. I would agree with St. Augustine that "an unjust law is no law at all"

Now, what is the difference between the two? How does one determine whether a law is just or unjust? A just law is a man-made code that squares with the moral law or the law of God. An unjust law is a code that is out of harmony with the moral law. To put it in the terms of St. Thomas Aquinas: An unjust law is a human law that is not rooted in eternal law and natural law. Any law that uplifts human personality is just. Any law that degrades human personality is unjust.

—Martin Luther King Jr.  Letter from a Birmingham Jail

This is ultimately what must put the Christian unwillingly in conflict with the government of the United States at times.  When the government decrees that it is permissible to degrade the human person, we must speak out against it, not bowing the knee to the unjust law… even if it comes from the Supreme Court or the Constitution itself.

However, there is a limit to what we can do.  If it comes to a choice between doing evil and suffering evil, we must choose the suffering of evil, as we may not choose an evil means to achieve the desired end.  Nor can we participate with the evil law.

So, in short, our opposition to injustice must be done in keeping with making a Christian witness.