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Our Obligations Begin Now

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Into Exile?

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What is Our Obligation? Body Count Theology and the Fallacy of Relative Privation

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What is a Proportionate Reason? A Reflection

Introduction.

A reader on my blog page asked me for a clarification on what a Proportionate Reason was when it comes to moral theology and the abortion issue. It reminded me that sometimes what think is clear, the average reader might see as technical jargon. So, I apologize for not being clear and will try to explain it without sounding too technical or patronizing. (I suspect I may have to apologize in advance for not succeeding there).

Some Basic Things to Remember.

When dealing with evil and what enables it, we need to make a few basic statements. 

First. We are absolutely forbidden to do an evil act so good may come of it.

Second. To have a morally good act, the action itself must be morally good or neutral (no intrinsically evil acts [that is, the act itself is bad regardless of conditions] can ever be made good), the intention is good (doing something good or neutral for an evil reason makes the act evil), and the circumstances must be good (giving a Snickers bar to a starving child who turns out to have a peanut allergy is bad, even if no harm was intended).

Third. The conditions that make up a mortal sin require committing a serious (grave) evil, knowing it was evil and freely choosing to do it anyway.

Fourth. If it’s impossible to know something (for example, Native Americans in pre-Colombian times absolutely could not have known of the need to accept Christ) and the person acted wrongly, thinking what they did was good, God will not hold a person responsible for that ignorance, even though wrong is done. We call this invincible ignorance. But, if the ignorance was something that could have been learned if the person bothered to look but was negligent, that isn’t excusable. We call this vincible ignorance.

Fifth. The person who knows they have committed a grave sin need to go to Confession before receiving communion (Canon 916). Notorious and unrepentant sinners who choose to go receive Communion anyway can be barred (Canon 915).

So, we could sum this up and say, since we may not do an evil act so good may come of it, we have an obligation to learn what the Church teaches and live it. We are without excuse if we reject the Church teaching and do evil, and we are without excuse if we do evil through ignorance that we could have cleared up if we bothered to look. We could wind up in a state of mortal sin if all conditions are present.

We can never deliberately choose to do evil or to freely and knowingly assist in that evil. (For example, you can never have a morally good rape or a morally good lynching). Even if a Catholic should dissent from Church teaching, they are not excused from obeying it. Otherwise “I disagree” could be an iron clad defense for geocide or murder. If anybody does take part in assisting evil knowingly and willingly, they are responsible for having done evil. So, in the Ratzinger Memorandum, he mentions voting for someone because they are pro-abortion as an example of being obligated to stay away from receiving the Eucharist.

But What About Acts that Aren’t Intrinsically Evil

So, let’s move on. Keeping the above things in mind, let’s move on to Proportionate Reasons that justify an act that is not intrinsically evil in itself, but still makes the evil act possible. 

The immediately relevant part of the Ratzinger Memorandum, the part that gets dragged out every four years, is the section on voting. Voting in itself a civic duty, not an intrinsic evil. Therefore, any sin involved comes from the intention or the consequences.

While deliberate evil in a vote exists if one deliberately chose to vote to support something the Church condemned as evil, we still need to consider the consequences of voting for something that will have an evil consequence, even if unintended. This isn’t a “moral calculus” where we decide X amount of evil is tolerable, while X+1 is not. Instead we have to consider whether the person who enabled the evil had a reason that took away culpability.

If the person knows that voting for a candidate who publicly states his support for something the Church labels evil would enable this bad result (and not being aware indicates a defect in knowledge of Church teaching or the politician’s position), the greater the evil enabled means the greater the reason is needed proportionate to the harm done (there’s where we get the term proportionate reason) is needed to justify the participation in the act.

I’ve pointed out elsewhere that the Catholic Church has (in Gaudium et Spes #27) listed abortion next to murder and genocide in talking about evils. So, we cannot simply treat abortion as one issue among many any more than we can treat murder or genocide as one issue among many. 

This is where the Catholic risks stepping into a trap. It is easy for any concerned Catholic—who has sympathies for one party at odds with the Church in some way—to confuse the reasons they dislike the other party for proportionate reasons. Since the Church does speak so strongly against abortion, unless they can offer a proportionate reason for voting for a pro-abortion candidate that they would accept if used by a Catholic trying to justify voting for murder, genocide, or torture, I honestly don’t think they can defend their vote. This is why I think the insight from Archbishop Chaput is so important: 

We sin if we support “pro-choice” candidates without a truly proportionate reason for doing so—that is, a reason grave enough to outweigh our obligation to end the killing of the unborn. And what would such a “proportionate” reason look like? It would be a reason we could, with an honest heart, expect the unborn victims of abortion to accept when we meet them and need to explain our actions—as we someday will.

Chaput, Charles J. Render Unto Caesar: Serving the Nation by Living our Catholic Beliefs in Political Life (p. 230). The Crown Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.

So, the Catholic who says “I am justified in supporting a pro-abortion candidate because of the evils in the other candidate,” must be able to face God and the victims of the policy that this evil invoked at the final judgment and say, “Yes this was more urgent.”

I would like to conclude by bringing up another issue frequently forgotten when people debate proportionate reasons. That is, the same moral obligations that bind the Catholic considering voting for a pro-abortion candidate also apply for the Catholic considering a vote for his opponent. If that Catholic votes for the other candidate because of his support of the evil position, that voter is also culpable for that evilly intended vote. And, yes, the requirement for a proportionate reason applies to his vote for the opponent with a morally wrong platform too.

None of us are exempted from the obligation of looking to the Church to understand our moral obligations in being a Christian and following them to the best of our understanding and ability to form our consciences. None of this can be set aside because “the stakes are too high” in this election. While we must not be scrupulous in seeking to do right, we must not be lax either. So, when a candidate proudly states they will support something we know is evil, we do have an obligation to oppose it in a moral way.

And, if we should ever become convinced that we have failed to do this, let us remember that we have a Sacrament that reconciles us with God and His Church. Let us avail ourselves of that Sacrament, making a firm purpose of amendment to strive to live according to God’s commandments.

Thoughts on the Misuse of the Ratzinger Referendum in 2020

Everybody has talking points they use to promote their position and refute their opponent’s. Sometimes these talking points have merit to them. At other times, they are merely rattled off like an incantation intended to ward off an opponent’s challenge, but with no real understanding of what it actually means. 

Unfortunately, in 2020, we are seeing a very nuanced document—commonly known as the Ratzinger Memorandum—turned into an incantation by both sides, each conveniently reading it in a way to attack the other side, with no attempt to apply it to their own. This memorandum (which can be read HERE) was written in response to a question by the disgraced and defrocked McCarrick on whether one would be unworthy to receive Communion if they held a position in opposition to Church teaching. Only two points ever get cited by partisan Catholics. Section #3 and the bracketed Nota Bene. For convenience, they are reproduced here:

3. Not all moral issues have the same moral weight as abortion and euthanasia. For example, if a Catholic were to be at odds with the Holy Father on the application of capital punishment or on the decision to wage war, he would not for that reason be considered unworthy to present himself to receive Holy Communion. While the Church exhorts civil authorities to seek peace, not war, and to exercise discretion and mercy in imposing punishment on criminals, it may still be permissible to take up arms to repel an aggressor or to have recourse to capital punishment. There may be a legitimate diversity of opinion even among Catholics about waging war and applying the death penalty, but not however with regard to abortion and euthanasia.

* * *

[N.B. A Catholic would be guilty of formal cooperation in evil, and so unworthy to present himself for Holy Communion, if he were to deliberately vote for a candidate precisely because of the candidate’s permissive stand on abortion and/or euthanasia. When a Catholic does not share a candidate’s stand in favour of abortion and/or euthanasia, but votes for that candidate for other reasons, it is considered remote material cooperation, which can be permitted in the presence of proportionate reasons.]

Those who intend to vote for a pro-abortion candidate cite the nota bene and argue (dubiously at best) that the candidate’s other positions or the positions of the other candidate, become a “proportionate reason.” Those who support another candidate who is not pro-abortion candidate but is also morally bad in other areas emphasize Section #3 and say there is nothing wrong with voting for a candidate who supports those things. Both are misinterpreting the matter.

When it comes to the issue of abortion, we need to remember that the Catholic Church equates it with other barbarities. In Gaudium et Spes #14, we read:

Furthermore, whatever is opposed to life itself, such as any type of murder, genocide, abortion, euthanasia or wilful self-destruction, whatever violates the integrity of the human person, such as mutilation, torments inflicted on body or mind, attempts to coerce the will itself; whatever insults human dignity, such as subhuman living conditions, arbitrary imprisonment, deportation, slavery, prostitution, the selling of women and children; as well as disgraceful working conditions, where men are treated as mere tools for profit, rather than as free and responsible persons; all these things and others of their like are infamies indeed. They poison human society, but they do more harm to those who practice them than those who suffer from the injury. Moreover, they are supreme dishonor to the Creator.

So, the candidate who supports abortion cannot be simply excused for it in the name of the other positions he might support any more than a candidate who supports genocide can be excused. This isn’t a rhetorical appeal. The Catholic Church calls these things infamies. So, when you have a Democrat who supports some of the infamies listed and a Republican who supports others on the list of infamies, you cannot say that voting for them is morally good. Nor can you claim that the issues your candidate is wrong on (if it’s on the list) is unimportant.

With this in mind, the Catholic who says they are enthusiastic supporters of the candidate who announces his intent to promote and/or defend these infamies have—at best—grossly misunderstood Church teaching. Since both major party candidates in 2020 are at odds with some items on this list, the only appropriate attitude for a Catholic who believes he or she must vote for one of them must be an attitude of sorrow and reluctance… a sense that both are terrible, but one will do less damage to the moral good than the other. Such an attitude cannot say that “Well, issue X is more important, so we’ll fight Issue Y ‘later.’”

No. It seems to me that Catholics belonging to a major party must vote in the primaries against a candidate who supports one or more of the infamies. If said candidate makes it to the national election, we had better (to build on something said by Archbishop Chaput§) make sure our reasons are going to be justifiable before God and the victims of our vote at the final judgment. If we act as if the issue our party is wrong on is “less important,” then let’s stop the pretense that we will fight for the other issue “later.” We should be fighting now to reform whatever party we identify with so they might be less inclined to nominate a similar candidate next time. That fight doesn’t end on Wednesday, November 4th 2020.

If we truly think that the candidate we vote for is the lesser of two evils† and he gets elected, the Catholics who voted for him had better take a “You broke it, you bought it” attitude when it comes to the evils they identified as “lesser.” The Catholics who voted for his opponent had better work to eliminate those evils within their own party. Unfortunately, this never seems to happen.

I would like to address another error Catholics commit in citing the Ratzinger Memorandum against the US Bishops on the Death Penalty. It is true that Benedict XVI (then-Cardinal Ratzinger) did point out that support of the death penalty was morally tolerable. But we need to remember that this was written in 2004. It is superseded by what Pope Francis wrote in 2018, amending the Catechism on the Death Penalty. Benedict XVI was not in error in 2004, because the teaching was not yet refined. But those Catholics who think they can treat the 2018 teaching as if the 2004 memorandum outranked it have fallen into a dangerous error. There is no more permissible “legitimate diversity” of opinion here.

But, before those Catholics who already opposed the death penalty get too smug, let them remember this: If they recognize that Catholics who treat the death penalty as a “lesser issue” are wrong, then they are utterly without excuse if they treat abortion the same way. It is true we can easily defend Pope Francis’ change on the grounds that self defense requires the minimum force required and in modern times, the death penalty is no longer the minimum force required. However, the supporter of a pro-abortion candidate can’t escape the fact that abortion can never be justified. As long as Christianity existed, abortion was condemned as murder… which is an infamy. So if Catholics who support a candidate who is in favor of the death penalty are wrong, where does it leave the Catholics who support a pro-abortion candidate?‡

___________________

(§) What he said was: ‘And what would such a “proportionate” reason look like? It would be a reason we could, with an honest heart, expect the unborn victims of abortion to accept when we meet them and need to explain our actions—as we someday will.’ (Chaput, Charles J. Render Unto Caesar: Serving the Nation by Living our Catholic Beliefs in Political Life (p. 230). The Crown Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.

I believe we can logically extrapolate from this and apply it to all issues that the Catholic Church describes as Infamies.

(†) One of the propaganda pieces used by some Catholics is “voting for the lesser of two evils is still choosing evil.” The irony is, it tends to be used by Catholics who enthusiastically intend to vote for a different candidate (hopefully in spite of) who still supports an infamy against a Catholic who reluctantly plans to vote for the other. It overlooks the possibility of a Catholic voter seeking to reduce damage as much as possible (much like accepting the consequences of a side swipe to avoid a head-on collision). 

(‡) Please don’t argue that you are “eliminating the need for abortion.” That doesn’t work for the other infamies listed in Gaudium et Spes, and it doesn’t work here either.

Lazarus is at Your (Political) Door

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